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DAMAGES IN THE PUBLICIZATION OF BRIDGES.
The act of May 8th, 1876,' authorizes the exemption of the
users of private bridges from the duty of paying tolls to the
bridge companies, six viewers assessing the damages to the latter.
These damages are to be paid out of the treasury of the county
wherein the bridge is. If the bridge spans a stream which devides counties, these must pay the damages in equal shares.
Although the charter of a bridge company reserves to the
state the power to purchase the bridge after the lapse of a certain time, by the payment of a defined price, this reservation is
not exclusive of the eminent domain; and of the power to take
before the expiration of that time, or to take for a different consideration2 .
In taking the bridge, the county may be compelled to take
and pay for other structures. At the distance of 155 feet from
an end of the bridge was a canal which was spanned by a bridge.
By a contract between the bidge company and the canal company, the former agreed to take the canal bridge "off the hands"
of the latter. The former afterward widened this bridge and rebuilt it, using in part, the old foundation walls. After the erection of the bridge undergoing condemnation, the bridge company
purchased a lot near its east end, and erected thereon a dwelling
house for the occupancy of the toll gatherer. The court required
the county to give compensation for the canal bridge and for the
house, if the jury found them a "necessary part and parcel of
the main bridge, as a convenient and necessary approach to it"'.

'P. L.

131; 2 P. & L. Dig. 4164.
2I.ock Haven Bridge Co. v. Clinton County. 157 Pa. 379.
"Montgomery County v. Schuylkill Bridge Co., i|o Pa. 54. Of a contrary tendency are Chambersburg & Bedford Turnpike Co., 2o Super. 173,
York & Gettysburg Turnpike Co. iS York, 49.
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In the discussion of damages in cases of publicizing turnpikes, it was contended that the material road must be considered
as a unit along with the right or franchise to use it, as a toll producer, that it is unscientific to consider the material road as having a certain value, and the franchise to have a separate value;
to add these values together, and to regard the sum as the amount
of compensation which must be made to the company. The
same principles are applicable t6 bridges. They are unchangeably dedicated to the public. The motive, on the part of the
company, for this dedication, is the obtaining of the tolls which
for the use of the bridge, the public may be compelled to pay.
If the power to collect these tolls were taken away, the company
would have nothing of value left. Without the bridge it is true
these tolls would not be realized, but equally they would not be
realized without the franchise. Some of the decisions however,
while conceding that the franchise adds value to the bridge, hold
that the bridge has a separate and independant value.
The earning power is an element of value. Hence, the circumstances which might increase or diminish it,are relevant'.
If there are other bridges in the neighborhood, over the same
stream, and which are free, they will tend to lessen the patronage of the toll bridge in question. Hence it may be shown that
there have been recently erected free bridges a mile below and a
mile above, upon the same river, connecting the same town with
the adjacent country. "The natural effect of the free bridges,"
says Sterrett C. J., "would be to attract at least some travel that
would otherwise pass over the plaintiff company's bridge, and to
that extent affect its income from tolls." 5
A bridge in a thickly settled community whose members
travel much, will have more patronage than one in a less populous neighborhood. It is relevant therefore, to consider the size
of the population dwelling in proximity to the bridge.'
In order to continue to earn tolls, the bridge must continue
in a safe condition. If at the condemnation if,is new and strong,
the maintenance of this safeness, at least for some years, will involve but little expenditure. If it is old, and out of repair, early
and considerable outlays will be necessary, lessening the net earning power. Hence the age of the bridge, the extent of its de4

Lock Haven Bridge Co. v. Clinton County, 157 Pa. 379.
6ld. So it may be shown that upon the making free of the rival bridges,
the patronage of the bridge undergoing condemnation was reduced in fact.
6
Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365.
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terioration by time and use, are relevant.
Independently of any
theory that in estimating the compensation payable t6 the bridge
company, the value of the bridge Per se is to be allowed, it is
evident that the 'character of the bridge may be shown; that it is
e. g. in bad condition, that there are cracks in its masonry, that
the stones in the abutments and piers are of inferior quality,
that the arches are strained, that the structure is out of line,
that it is without proper braces, that its roof is worn and leaky8 ,
or, on the other hand, that both superstructure and masonry are
of good quality.
The bridge may be peculiarly situated with respect to exposedness to violent winds, to floating logs, to ice, to storms and
floods, which will imperil its very existence or compel expenditures for its reconstruction or repair. This fact would affect the
probable continuance of its earning power, or the outlays necessary to maintain it, which would reduce the net earnings. It
may therefore be shown by the county-"
What the bridge is capable of earning, must, all will concede,
affect its value. The loss to a company by the taking of a
bridge that earns 10 per cent upon the par of its stock, is greater
than that by the taking of one which earns but 5 per cent. The
receipts and expenditures for a series of years, expenditures e.g.
in the salaries of the toll collector, the treasurer, and manager, for
gas and in taxes, may be shown" or, in other words, the net tolls."2
But having admitted in evidence the receipts of the company for
the last five years, the court is not bound to admit them for forty
or fifty years, ever since the organization of the corporation, the
neighborhood having at that early time been thinly populated in
comparison with the present density.'" The same company may
TClarion Turnpike & Bridge Co. v. Clarion County, 172 Pa. 243; Lock
Haven Bridge Co. v. Clinton County, 157 Pa. 379. The bridge was 25 years
old. In Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365, pending the condemnation proceedings a flood swept the bridge away and damaged the
piers. The company nevertheless, reerected it, and was entitled to the value
of a new bridge.
S157 Pa. 379.
aMifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365.
"°Lock Haven Bridge Co. v. Clinton County, 157 Pa. 379; Mifflin Bridge
Co. v. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365.
"Lock Haven Bridge Co. v. Clinton Co., 157 Pa. 379, 383; Mifflin Bridge
Co. v. Juniata County 144 Pa. 365.
12Clarion Turnpike & Bridge Co. v. Clarion County, '172 Pa. 243. The
company also owning a turnpike, the fact that its gains from the bridge
were spent on the road is immaterial.
13Montgomery County v. Bridge Co., io Pa. 54.

THE FORUM
maintain a turnpike and also a bridge connecting portions of the
road. Even were the bridge regarded as a portion of the road,
when it is taken by the county its value as a separate thing,
must be allowed to the company. Hence, the-principle is not
correct that if the property as a whole, i. e. the road and bridge
together, yield no net revenue, the bridge is of no value, since
it may be productive and lessen the losses from the road portion
of the property."
The property and franchises of the bridge company are represented by its stock, and the market value of the stock may be
said to represent, says Paxson. J., the market value of the property taken, as nearly as it can be ascertained." The county may
prove the value, against the company, by the yearly returns made
by the officers of the latter to the auditor general. The proceedings pending in 1890, it was shown that in 1881 and 1882, the
value returned was $25 per share, in 1883, $16; in 1884, $20, in
1885, $22; in 1886-1888, $25. The returns of the officers must
be deemed returns of the corporation. 6 They do not however conclude it, but they are competent and important evidence. The
verdict of the jury being very much greater than the valuation of
stock returned to the auditor general, Paxson, J., remarked that
the difference was "so great as to justify the suggestion that the
verdict was too large, or the company has under-valued its property to escape taxation."'
The dividends declared from time to time by the corporation,
are an indication of the net profits made. They may be shown
by the county in order to keep down the damages; but, apparently, they may be put in evidence by the corporation itself "as
an element [said McClure, P. J.,] in determining the value of the
structure and franchises."'"
The county cannot show that the
dividends paid were illegally large. It has no standing, says
Paxson, J., "to complain in this proceeding, especially as it was
the holder of a considerable amount of the stock and participated
in the dividends," 19 a somewhat inept observation. The county
was not "complaining", but was correcting an inference as to the
net profits of the business from the size of the dividends. Its
Pa 243.
' Montgomery County v. Bridge Co., i o Pa. 4; Clarion Turnpike &
1"172

1

Bridge

Co. v.

Clarion County, 172 Pa. 243.

' 6 Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata County, 144 Pa- 365.
17144 Pa. 365.
"Lock Haven Bridge Co. v. Clinton County, 157 Pa. 379.
' 9Montgomery Co. v. Bridge Co. iio Pa. 54.
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participation in the dividends may not have involved knowledge
that they were excessive. But if it did, surely this participation
should not estop the county when an improper use is to be made
by the corporation of the size of the dividends. The corporation may cheat the state by minimizing the value of its stock and
property, and yet not "conclude" itself from showing, as against
the county, that the actual value was larger. Why should the
county be estopped from correcting a wrong inference from the
bigness of the dividends by showing that they were larger than
the net profits justified?
The value of the bridge to the county, at the time of its taking is not the measure of the damages to which the corporation
is entitled. Possibly the county might build another bridge, at
another street for half the money, but, as it has elected to take
the corporation's bridge, it must pay the corporation its value
to it.2° To it, it is a toll-earning implement; to the county not.
If however the supposititious value of the bridge, as distinct
from the franchise annexed to it, is to be ascertained and allowed, it is difficult to see how the bridge is worth more now,
than the cost of the erection now, of a precisely similar bridge.
Paxson, C.J., in a later case"1 again remarks, "It was not relevant to show what the county could have erected a new bridge
for, at this or some other point. The county might have erected
a new bridge, but it preferred to take the bridge of the plaintiff,
and must pay for it at its value to the latter."
It surely must
pay the value of the bridge andfranchise to the latter, but if the
bridge is to be separated and appraised, apart' from the franchise,
why is not the present cost of an exactly similar bridge, its value?
Indeed, in approving the refusal of the trial court 2 to affirm the
point that "the measure of damages is the cost of the construction of a new bridge at the time of the taking by the county,
similar to the present one, diminished by an amount in proportion to such cost equal to the depreciation of the old bridge from
wear'and decay,"
Paxson J. says that the "vice of it consists in
the fact, that it substituted one of the elements of damages for the
measure of damages itself. The bridge structure, the stone,
iron and wood, was but a portion of the property owned by the
bridge company and taken by the county. These were the
franchises of the company, including the right to take toll, and
2'Montgornery
Co. v. Bridge Co., xio Pa. 54.
2
1Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata Co. 134 Pa. 365.
2iro Pa. 54.
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these were as effectually taken as the bridge itself. - Hence, to
measure the damages by the mere cost of building the bridge,
would be to deprive the company of any compensation for the
destruction of its franchises. The latter can no more be taken
without compensation than can its tangible, corporeal property."
In Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata County 2' the trial court took a
more radical position. It refused evidence of what a new bridge
could be erected for, as a means of showing the value-not of all
the property of the company, but of the bridge itself. Objection
was made, that the county could procure the making of a bridge
below its actual cost! The supreme court approved the exclusion of the evidence for the reason mentioned suIt/-a.
What the bridge cost at the time of its erection, is not receivable as evidence of its present value. "The contractor," it
is suggested, "may have taket too low a figure, or the owner
may have paid too much."'" The cost of masonry in the erection of the bridge pending the proceedings to condemn, is not receivable. The proper way to prove its value, is to obtain estiProbably another
mates of witnesses, of its present worth.'
reason for excluding the original cost of the bridge, is the fact
that it would have to be supplemented by evidence of the loss of
value since."' It is to be observed that in West Chester etc.
Company v. Chester County 27 the cost of the original construction is treated as admissible; only the jury are not to. be "controlled" by it, and surely this is the better view. Indeed, in several cases, the cost of fhe bridge is mentioned as a fact which
may aid in reaching a conclusion as to present value.'
23144 Pa. 365.
2

4Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365.

The evidence was

offered for the purpose of showing what the actual worth of the bridge was

and as a test of the judgment of the witness, who had testified to the present value of the bridge. It was nevertheless rejected.
25Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365.
"'Lock Haven Bridge Co. v. Clinton County, 157 Pa. 379.

McClure rejected the part of the cost, saying that the "measure of damages is the value
of the bridge and franchise at the time of the taking."
2
SGLock Haven Bridge Co. v. Clinion County, 157 Pa. 379, McClure rejected the proof of the cost, saying thitt the "measure of damages is the
value of the bridge and franchise at the time of the taking."
27182 Pa. 40. Cf. also Chambersburg and Bedford Turnpike Co. 2o
Super. 173.

!Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata County, 144 Pa. 365; 375; In Turnpike

o
Co. v. Clarion County, 172 Pa. 243, 25 , evidence was given that the orig-

inal cost of the bridge was ten to twelve thousand dollars. In Montgomery
Co. v. Bridge Co., i to Pa. 54, evidence that the cost of the bridge had been

$29,080, was offered in conjunction with other evidence which was inadmis-

sible, and all was rejected.
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A bridge has but one use to the public, that of furnishing
means of passage from one side of a stream to another; and but
one use to the company that "owns" it; that of earning for it
tolls. As a toll-earner, its value depends on the amount of tolls
it will earn for an indefinite time less the expense of the management, of the repairing and reconstruction that may become
necessary in order to maintain this earning power. This particular use, "is the only one" says Paxson J., "of which the bridge
The company cannot turn it into a mill or dwellis capable." '
ing house; it may not tear it'down, and sell or otherwise dispose
of the timbers, iron, stones, etc., composing it. Even if it could,
this timber and iron and these stones would have an insignificant value. The value of the masonry and carpentry, of the
architectonic process by which the materials had been made into
a useful unit would be wholly sacrificed and destroyed. It hence
follows that having but the single use of earning tolls, its value
consists in, is the value of this earning power. Hence the measure
of this value is the size and number from year to year, of the
net profits which it is able to earn. "If" says Paxson J., "the
damages [from the deprivation of the bridge] cannot be measured by that use, they can be measured by no other. In this respect it differs from ordinary property, taken under the right of
eminent domain." This was said in rejecting the complaint of
the appellant that it was wrong for the trial court to permit evidence of past annual net profits from the particular use of the
property, i. e. from its use as a toll-earner. The lower court in
disposing of the objection that past profits could not be a guide
to value had said "The use for 'Which the bridge was and only
could be taken under the law [by the county] is the same use to
which it was devoted by the company, and the only one for
which it could be of any considerable value, to wit, public
travel." The only other use, truly, is to break it to pieces and
sell the discerped fragments.
The present value of the bridge is the present value in money
of the bhance to earn the net tolls which it will earn. The net tolls
it will earn must be inferred from the gross tolls already earned,
the expenses already found incident to the earning of them, the
situation of the bridge, the populousness of the neighborhood, the
actual or probable competition of other bridges. If the bridge
is new, durable, well built, and of the best material, it will probably earn tolls without material repairs, for a considerable time,
'Montgomery County v. Bridge Co. ixo Pa. 54.
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and, as affecting the net toll earning power, these qualities will
be relevant subjects of investigation. But how from any other
point of view, can they be? A bridge of gold or platinum
would earn no more toll than one of wood, and if, once built,
the owners of it could never make any other use of its material,
it would have but the value of a bridge of wood, that would
wear as long without repair. It follows, that, so far as the
physical bridge is concerned, the only relevant inquiry concerns
its power to last without the expense of repair and renewal.
The cases later than Montgomery County v. Bridge Co.'
have lost sight of the true nature of the value.
In Mifflin Bridge Co. v. Juniata County3 ' Paxson C. J., no
longer saying that the value of the brfidge consists in its power
to earn tolls, distinguishes between the bridg'e and the right and
power to earn tolls, called the franchise, and says that the value,
not of the bridge, but of the franchise, "depends largely upon
its earning capacity."
The bridge is conceived as having, per
se, a value. " Hence," he says, "in an action against a county
for taking a bridge, the cost or value of the structure [as if cost
and value were the same] the amount of tolls, and the market
value of its capital stock are all elements to be considered in ascertaining the value of the bridge and its corporate franchises."
He does not suggest from what point of view they are "elements."
Is the company entitled to the cost of the bridge? Surely not.
The cost must be considered simply as casting light on some
fact which affects value. But, what fact, except the probable
present durability and attractiveness of the bridge, and its consequent power to earn tolls in the future with little repair? The
past prices of shares of stock are an "element."
But how, except as indicating the judgment of the sellers and the buyers, as
to the capacity of the bridge to earn dividends upon the investment ? The court below had said to the jury "It seems that this
stock was held by a comparatively few, and there was no real
market for it, not because it had no value, but because there
were no purchasers, no sellers; so, in the absence of evidenlce of
the market value of the stock, the jury must get at the damages
30 io Pa. 54"1I44 Pa. 365. In Clarion Turnpike & Bridge Co. v. Clarion County,
172 Pa. 243, the true measure of damages is said to be just compensation
for the loss suffered in consequence of the taking of the property, being the
substructure, superstructure and approaches of the bridge together with the
franchise or right to take tolls.
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as best they can. I therefore charge you that, in estimating the
damages in this particular question, you are to take into consideration the valuc of thc pliysical structme at the time the county
of Juniata appropriated it to its use; and this value must be arrived at by taking into consideration the length and width of the
structure, the number of peers that supported the superstructure,
the value of the masonry, the value of the fill and abutments, as
well as [of] the superstructure, and to that yopi are to add the
value of the franchise."
Then the jury are told that the franchise though invisible, may be worth really more than "the physical.structure in the particular case"! The length and the width
of a bridge affect its original cost. The greater they are, the
more material there is in the bridge,. and if the material is ever
taken out of the bridge and sold, it will sell for more than a less
quantity. But, if it is never to be taken out, if the law does not
permit it to be taken out, how does its quantity affect the value
of the bridge? The longer the bridge the larger the toll that may
be collected for its use. the wider the bridge, the more convenient its use, and therefore, possibly, the larger its patronage,
i. e. the larger its toll earning power. But it is for the toll
earning power alone that the bridge has value; and, length and
breadth, are important, only as indicating the amount of this
power. If a bridge with four piers will last as long, require as
little repair and attract as much custom as a bridge with eight,
how will the larger number of piers add value to the bridge as
a bridge? As a quarry of stones, on the discerption of the mmsonry, it will have larget value, truly, but not otherwise. What
can be the value of a fill? Is a bridge that, in order to secure
its stability, and the safety and convenience of its use, needs a
fill, for that reason more valuable than one that does not? It
costs more, but surely the cost of a structure is not to be adopted
as the measure of damages when it is taken by the public, and
the case under discussion so rules.
In Lock Haven Bridge Co. v. Clinton County, ': - there was
an absurd dissectioi of th6 bridge into piers, abutments, tollhouse, superstructure. Why it Was not carried further, why roof
sides, floor, why rafters, bolts, nails, were 'not differentiated,
does not appear. - The trial court tells the jury that it had "admitted this evidence of the value of these different parts of the
bridge in order that you may arrive at its value."
Apparently
the value of the bridge is the sum of the values of all its parts;
32157 Pa. 379.
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or does the combinalion itself also have a value ? Unfortunately
there was no evidence as to the value of that combination.
Now what could have been the value of a pier? Its cost? The
price at which for purpose of removal, it could be sold? Or has it,
as a pier, standing in the water but dissociated from all else, a
usable quality, on account of which it has a value? It is evident
that, if the bridge is to be considered as a mass of materials
which may be separated from each other and disposed of, it is of
use to investigate pier and abutment, toll house and superstructure. But, the value they have for this purpose is inconsistent
with the value of them as a bridge, and could only he relevant
when the bridge, as such, is worth less than the material composing it would sell for.
The trial court proceeds to tell the jury that they are to take
the value of the bridge, as ascertained by the adding together of
the values of the several parts, "in connection with the value of
the franchise, or right to take toll."
The franchise, then, has a
value; the bridge has a value. The two values are to be taken
in "'connection" with each other. What must have been the
perplexity of the jury when later they were told "the value of
the franchise cannot be ascertained as a separate and distinct
item of damage, but must be considered [what must? the franchise, or the value of the franchise?] in connection with the
property to which it appertains!"
What was in the judge's
mind was the thought that there is no abstract franchise, with a
value. The franchise was to maintain and use not a bridge over
any stream, or over this stream at any point, but to maintain and
use as a means of earning tolls, this particular bridge. It is not
a little remarkable that he did not further see, that the franchise
thus inseparable from the bridge, could have no value, apart
from the bridge, nor the bridge apart from the franchise; and
that the indissoluble bridge and franchise, had the one simple,
indecomposable power of earning tolls, and that their value was
the value of this power.
If the county had simply taken from the bridge company the
right to take tolls, leaving to it the bridge, the company would
have seen that as a bridge it was worth nothing; but as a quarry
out of which so many stones, so much iron, so much lumber
would be taken, it was worth what these things would sell for.
When then the county not only took the franchise, but also the
bridge, it simply took in addition the value of the material in it.
The ablation of the franchise, i. e. of the right to collect tolls,
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destroys the value to the company of the bridge, as a totality.
It is only in the case in which the toll-earning capacity is worth
less than the separated materials of the bridge, that the value of
the latter can be considered. And when the value of the tollearning capacity is equal to or greater than this value, that
value is the only one for the loss of which the corporation is entitled to compensation. Yet, the trial judge affirmed the point
"that the jury cannot allow as a measure of damages, a gross
sum that would yield an income equal to the past or anticd.ated
net ;6rofls," in a case in which the jury returned a verdict of
$14,141.25, a sum vastly more than the value of the material of
the bridge!
It is evident that there are alternate measures of damages
when a bridge is taken. If the toll-earning power in the future
is worth more than the materials of which the bridge is composed
when taken away, the damages will be the value of that power.
Otherwise, the value will be that of the materials of which the
bridge is composed; i. e. the money for which they can be sold.
For learning what the earning power in the future will be, what
it has been is an indicium. So are the characters and size of
the adjacent population. So are the durability and attractiveness of the bridge; the presence or absence, actual or prospective,
of rival bridges. The judgment of financiers as to the value of
the earning power, that of buyers and sellers of stock of the comlpany, that of the company as to the value of the property disclosed
in official returns made for the purpose of taxation, are of use in
learning the value of the earning faculty of the bridge.
It is regrettable that the principle laid down by Paxson J.
in Montgomery County v. Bridge Company' and still more
clearly by Albert D. Wilson, Esq., as master, in Somerton Turnpike" should have been ignored.
331 IO Pa.

54.

3416 Super. 400.
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THE NEWEST NEOLOGISM OF THE SUPREME COURT.
From the foundation of the government in 1789 to the year
1907 few authoritative thinkers have broached the opinion that
the United States is other than a Federal State of limited and defined powers. It has been conceded even by ultra-Federalists or
Nationalists, that political power is divided within the geographical limit of any state, between that state and the larger Federal
state which came into existence by the adoption of the Constitution. These two states cover the same soil, and have for subjects, the same persons, but these persons are the subjects of one,
with respect to certain matters while with respect to other matters, they are the subjects of the other.

The Constitution is the definition of the powers which the
thirteen states relinquished to the Federal State, and its adoption
was the act by which this State was formed; by which the thirteen for some purposes became one. "A new political body, a
new nation; then for the first time" took its place in the family
of nations.' "Itwas then that a nation was born.''
As two states were intended to pervade the same area, it was
necessary that their respective spheres of power should be marked off. This could be more easily effected by defining the powers which were designed to be alienated by the states, because they
were. far fewer than those to be retained. The constitution makers therefore, did not say in that instrument, that the new state,
the so-called United States, should have all the powers which
nations usually have, which Great Britain, Prussia, France,
Russia have, minus power a, power b,power c, etc. The converse method was pursued. Certain powers were distinguished
from the vast mass of powers inherent in states, and were named,
and these powers, thus defined and enumerated, were transferred
to the Federal State, while all other powers, previously inherent in
the states remained with them except a few which they agreed to
extinguish altogether. As Madison told the people of New
York in endeavoring to persuade them to ratify the constitution,
"The powers delegated by the proposed constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the state governments are numerous and indefinite."'
'Scott v. Sanford, 19 How. 393.
on the Conititution, p. 83; Kansis v. Colorado, S. C. Reporter,
June i 5 th, 1907.
:45th Federalist.
2Miller
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The powers conferred, are demarcated in the Constitution
as legislative, executive and judicial, and of the seven articles
which comprise that instrument, the first deals with the legislative, the second with the executive, and the third with the judicial.
It has heretofore been supposed that the powers of all these
classes created by the Constitution, are the subject therein of
particularization and enumeration.
"This government," said
Marshall, C. J. in 1819-and he was a safe reporter of the opinion then prevailing- "is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. The principle that it can exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem too apparent to have required to be
enforced by all those arguments which its enlightened friends
while it was depending before the people, found it necessary to
urge. That principle is now universally admitted."'
The reader of the Constitution will find in the first article,
the declaration that "The Congress shall have power" to lay and
collect taxes, to borrow money, to regulate commerce, to make
a rule of naturalization, to coin money, to establish post-offices,
etc. He cannot doubt that legislative powers are thus discriminated by subjects and enumerated. When he examines the second article, he discovers the declaration, the President shall be
commander-in-chief of the army and navy; he may grant pardons;
he may, with cooperation of the senate, make treaties, appoint
ambassadors, judges and other officers; he may convene congress,
receive ambassadors, take care that the laws be faithfully executed. He will be convinced that here also, is a specification of
the Powers which the president is to exercise. When he inspects
the third article, he finds a series of classes of judicial power,
cases underthe constitution, laws and treaties, cases affecting
ambassadors, cases of admiralty, cases in which the United
States is a party, cases between two or more states, between a
state and citizens of another state, etc. Until recently, he could
not well have doubted that here, again, was an enumeration,
this time of the judicial powers. In the language of Chief Justice Marshall, he would say the government, not as law giver, or
law enforcer only, but no less as maker of adjudications between
litigants, is one of "enumerated powers." In so thinking, however, he would, according to a recent decision of the U. S. Superior Court,5 commit a serious and fundamental blunder.
4McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wh. 316.

•Kansas v. Colorado,

27

Supreme Court Reporter, June s5 th, 1907.
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Justice Brewer concedes that the federal government is, as
to legislation, one of definite and enumerated powers. He passes in silence over the executive function. "On the other hand,"
he remarks, "in article three, which treats of the judicial department, we find that section 1 reads that the judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain
and establish. By this is gra
inted the entire judicial power of
the nation. Section 2 which provides that the judicial power
shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, etc., is not a limitation nor an enumeration. It is a definite declaration,--a provision that the judicial power thall extend to,-that is, shall include--the several matters particularly mentioned, leaving unrestricted the general grant of the entire judicial power. There
may be of course, limitations on that grant of power, but, if
there are any, they must be expressed7; for otherwise the general
grant would vest in the courts all the judicial power which the
new nation was capable of exercising

*

?*

*

Speaking gen-

erally, it may be observed that the judicial power of a nation extends to all controversies justiciable in their nature, and the parties to which or the property involved in which may be reached
by judicial process, and when the judicial power of the United
States was vested in the Supreme and other courts, all the judicial power which the nation was capable of exercising was vested
in those tribunals, and unless there be some limitations expressed in the Constitution, it must be held to embrace all controversies of a justiciable nature, arising within the territorial limits of
the nation, no matter who may be the parties thereto * * *
These considerations lead to the proposition that when a legislative power is claimed for the national government, the question
is whether that power is one of those granted by the Constitution either in terms or by necessary implication; whereas, in respect to judicial functions, the question is whether there be any
limitations expressed in the Constitution on the general grant of
national power."
It behooves us if we can to understand this deliverance. It
means apparently, in the first place, that the judicial power of
the United States no less than the executive or legislative, is the
result of a grant. By the first section of the third article, the
justice asserts, "is granted the entire judicial power of the nation." It is true that later he apparently contrasts, with respect
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to the necessity of a grant, the legislative with the judicial power, for, he says, when a particular power of the former class is
claimed, the question is whether it is "granted by the Constitution either in terms or by necessary implication," whereas etc.
If a power of any class is granted at all, it must be granted in
terms or by necessary implication, unless indeed we are to suppose that it may be granted by a logically unnecessary, a gratuitous, implication, and there can therefore be no difference between
legislative and judicial power, in this respect. The justice has
already said that the first section of the third article contains a
grant of judicial power. Surely it is an express grant or a grant
by necessary implication.
How much judicial power according to the court, does the
first section bestow? Its extent is variously stated. It is described as "The entire judicial power of the nation." Yes, truly,
but we desire to know how large that entire power is. We are
next informed that this power, unless there are express limitations upon it in the Constitution, is "all the judicial power
which the new nation was capable of exercising."
So satisfactory indeed does this formula seem, that it is repeated. What
does it mean? A nation was being made by surrenders of power by the states. These surrenders might be large or small, of
judicial and no legislative, of legislative and no judicial, power.
Or this or that legislative and this or that judicial power might
be bestowed. The new nation was getting only the powers that
were given to it. It had no capability except what it received.
What information then do we get when we are told that the
states, in the Constitution were giving to it all the powers which
it was capable of exercising ? If it got power a it would be
capable of exercising it. If it did not get power a, it could not exercise it. To say that it got all the power it was capable of exercising, is to say that it got all the power which it got. A power
surely does not desiderate a capability to exercise it, and this
capability in turn a still other capability to exercise it ad in/fniture.
To avoid a silly identical proposition, it is necessary for us
to understand the phrase of the justice to mean, that all the judicial power which any nation, any new nation, might derive by
gift from another and which the states were able to give, was
given by them to the United States, unless there is some express
limitation. The enumeration of section 2, is not an enumeration
of powers granted, but only of some of them. It is simply a
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declaration that the judicial power, elsewhere bestowed, shall,
not be confined to, but "include" the several matters particularly mentioned, "leaving unrestricted the general grant of the entire judicial power;" and embracing "all controversies of a justiciable nature arising within the territorial limits of the nation."
The states severally are within the territorial limits of the nation.
Innumerable cases involving crime, tort, breach of contract,
wills, divorce, distribution of decedents' estates are proving their
justiciableness by being actually entertained and decided daily
in their courts. These controversies arise within the territorial
limits of the nation. Judicial power over them has therefore
been conferred upon the United States. Such is the doctrine of
the court. Let us examine its foundations.
Justice Brewer's first postulate is, that the 1st section of the
3d article, and not the 2d, bestows the judicial power. Its language is "The judicial power of the United States shall be vested
in one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." This grants "the
entire judicial power to the nation," says the justice. But does
it? It grants not to the nation but to the courts; it vests in the
courts whatever judicial power is elsewhere bestowed. It means
evidently, all judicial power herein granted shall be vested in
one supreme court, etc. The 1st article begins "All legislative
power herein granted shall be vested in a Congress." Is this a
grant of legislative power? Is it not rather a description of the
organ which is to exercise it? The 8th section says, "The Congress shall have power to levy and collect taxes," etc. Here surely
is the grant of the legislative powers. We may pause here to
suggest that if the clause vesting the judicial power in the courts
is a grant of general judicial power, which is not restrained by
the enumeration of cases in the second section of article 3, the
clause vesting legislative power in Congress is a general grant of
that power, and is not restricted by the later enumeration of the
8th section for there is no express exclusion of other powers.
The 2d article begins "The executive power shall be vested
in a President of the United States." If this is a grant of all
executive power, what warrant is there for saying that the enumeration of powers in the 2d, 3d and 4th sections of that article
is a grant of it or a limitation upon-the general grant? The object
of the opening phrase of the article evidently is to name the
officer who is to wield the executive, the description of the power following in later portions of the article. The 3d article is
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built on the same plan. It first names the depositaries of the
judicial power, with no intention in so doing to grant it. It
then describeg and grants, by the words, "The judicial power
shall extend to all cases in law and equity," etc.
If the grant to the United States, of judicial power, is found
not elsewhere than in the phrase "The judicial power of the
United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish," until the courts are established, the power seems to
be nowhere. An interval elapsed before the creation of the
Supreme Court. When it was created, perhaps the original
jurisdiction defined in the 3d article instantly attached to it; but
the appellate jurisdiction awaited legislation from Congress.
Neither the original nor the appellate jurisdiction of the inferior
courts came into existence before the creation of the inferior
courts. It is the gift of Congress. It may be lessened, or enlarged, or varied, as Congress chooses. Despite the effort of
Story, J., 6 to prove that the words "shall extend" made it a constitutional duty of Congress to bestow on the courts the whole
judicial power enumerated in the 2d section of the 3d article, it
has since been accepted that Congress is under no such duty.
Congress gives or withholds, and giving, it gives to this court or
to that, as it will. Said Chase, J., in 1799' "The notion has
frequently been entertained that the Federal Courts derive their
judicial power immediately from the constitution; but the political truth is, that the disposal of the judicial power (except in a few
specified instances) belongs to Congress. If Congress has given
the power to this [the Supreme] court, we posses it; not otherwise; and if Congress has not given the power to us, or to any
other court, it still remains at the legislative disposal. Besides,
Congress is not bound, and it would perhaps be inexpedient, to
enlarge the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to every subject in
every form, which the Constitution might warrant."
There is
then a judicial power in the United States before it has
vested (and which, for a hundred years has not vested) in
any court. How then are we to say that the language bestowing this power is the 1st sect *on of the 3d Article?
The function of the 1st section is to declare that, when the judic6

Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, i Wheat. 304.
7Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dall. io; McIntire v. Wood, 7
Cranch, 5o6; Kendall v. U. S., iz Peters, 616; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 245;
Sheldon v. Sell, 8 How. 448.
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ial power of the United States is exercised at all, it shall be exercised by courts. The function of the second section is to bestow on the United States and to define the power.
That the 2d section defines and enumerates the whole judicial power and that there is no judicial power not contained in its
enumeration has been uniformly assumed. After mentioning
what he regarded the proper subjects of a federal judicial power,
Hamilton in the 80th Federalist says, "we shall proceed to test
by these principles the particular powers of which, according to
the plan of the convention, it is composed. It is to comprehend
all cases in law and equity arising under the constitution, the
laws of the United States, and treaties made or which shall be
made, under their authority," etc., [quoting the second section].
"This," he adds "constitutes the enthe mass of the judicial authority of the Union. Let us now review it in detail. It is
then to extend, First, to all cases in law and equity," etc.
A similar view was taken in the debates in the Virginia convention before which the ratification of the constitution was in
question. Those who opposed the constitution, no less than
those who advocated it, assumed that all the judicial power that
would be conferred by the ratification of the constitution was
that which is defined in the 2d section of Art. 3. Such was the
conception of John Marshall', of George Mason9 , of Pendleton'",
of Madison". The same was entertained in the Pennsylvania
convention by James Wilson"2 who, answering the objection that
the powers of the federal judiciary are too "indefinite," says,
"Let us examine this: The judicial power shall extend to all
cases in law and equity arising under the constitution and the
He then takes up serialin, the toplaws of the United States."
ics mentioned in the 2d section of article 3. Evidently neither
he nor others in the convention, supposed that there was conferred in the constitution jurisdiction over "all controversies of
a justiciable nature arising within the territorial limits of the
nation."
Chief Justice Jay found the "justice" which according to
the preamble of the constitution, the makers of it intended to
"establish," in the specifications of the 2d section of Article 3.
"They are specified in the 2d section of the 3d Article, where it
83 Elliot, 553.
93 Elliot, 521.
103

Elliott, 5"7.

113 Elliott, 531.
U"2

Elliot, 489.
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is ordained that the judicial power of the United States shall extend to ten descriptions of cases."' 3 "Certain specified powers
enumerated in the Constitution" says Taney, C. J.,"' "have been
conferred upon it (the nation) and neither the legislative,
executive nor judicial departments of the government can lawfully exercise any authority beyond the limits marked out by the
Constitution. And in regulating the judicial department, the
cases in which the courts of the United States shall have jurisdiction, are particularly and specifically enumerated, and they
are not authorized to take cognizance of any case which does not
come within the description therein specified." Said Chief Justice Marshall, "The second section of the third article of the Constitution defnes the extent of the judicial power of the United
States. Jurisdiction is given to the courts of the Union, in two
classes of cases. In the first, their jurisdiction depends on the
character of the cause, whoever may be the parties. * * * In
the second class, the jurisdiction depends entirely on the character of the parties." 5
That the Constitution makers regarded the enumeration of
the second section of the third article as inclusive of all the judicial power, is apparent from the second clause of the second
section. In four classes of cases in the enumeration it declares,
'the supreme court shall have original jurisdiction."
That
court can have no other original jurisdiction even with the gift
of Congress."6 Whatever other jurisdiction it has must be appellate. But the only appellate jurisdiction which it can receive,
is jurisdiction in " the other cases before mentioned." "In all
the other cases before mentioned the Supreme Court shall have
appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as the Congress shall make."
But, if the Supreme Court can exercise either originally or on appeal, only the jurisdiction enumerated in the first clause of the
second section, how preposterous is it to suggest that any other
court may exercise a jurisdiction not embraced within that enumeration. And it must be remarked that the observations of
Justice Brewer are made in a case in which the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was invoked!
'3Chesholm v. Georgia, 2 Dali. 419.
"Dred Scott v. Sanford, i9 How. 393.

15Cohens v. Virginia. 6 Wheat. 264. Quoted approvingly by the present
Chief Justice in Stevenson v. Fain, 195 W. S. 167.
' 6 Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch, 137.
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To one who has a predisposition to magnify the court of
which one is a member, the suggestion that it alone of the great
departments of government has a power which is not cribbed or
cabined and confined by enumerations, is flattering, and slight
proofs suffice to produce conviction. The opinion in Kansas v.
Colorado was not produced by the views of earlier jurists
and text writers." It seems to have been superinduced by the
capacity of the word "extend" to receive an absurd interpretation. "The judicial power shall extend to all cases" etc. "Extend to" means, says the Justice, "include."
There must be
other cases within the judicial power from which it must stretch,
extend, to the cases enumerated! Once before, it had been suggested-by lawyers-that the word meant to "widen to new
cases not before within the scope of the power," but this signification was rejected with the observation that neither the nation
nor its powers had had any previous existence. There was therefore no existing power of adjudication over some topics, that
might be widened so as to embrace others."8
That the word "extend" did not carry with it, in the usage
of the convention, the sense of stretching from one or more
things to other things, is rather clear. It was first used by
Charles Pinckney in a draft of a federal government which he
submitted to the convention at its third session. The draft provided inter alia for courts. "One of these courts" it said,"
"shall be termed the Supreme Court whose jurisdiction shall extend to all cases arising under the laws of the United States, or
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls; to the

trial or impeachment of officers of the United States; to all cases
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. In cases of impeachment, affecting ambassadors, and other public ministers, this jurisdiction shall be original, and in all other cases appellate."
There is no other clause conferring judicial power, here, than
that which "extends" it, and it would be preposterous to suppose
that the word "extend" implied other than the cases mentioned,
to which the judicial power was made to attach.
A study of the proceedings in the convention, and of the
form of this resolution, shows that it was the nucleus about
which all later suggestions concerning the judicial power gather1
Hare, Constitutional Law, Story, 2 Constitutional Law; Kent, 1 Comm.
295; Pomeroy, Const. Law, 625.
18 Martin v. Hunter's Lease, i Wheat. 304.

195 Elliott, 131.
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ed, and of which they were the expansion and modification." ° On
July 25th a series of resolutions was referred to the committee of
detail, the 16th of which was "'That the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend to cases arising under laws passed by
the general legislative, and to such other questions as involve
the national peace and safety."
When the committee of detail
made its report on August 6th, the 3d section of the 11th article
declared that "The j urisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend
to all cases arising under laws passed by the legislature of the
United States; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls; to the trial of impeachments of officers of
the United States; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction * * * The legislature may assign any part of the
jurisdiction above mentioned (except the trial of the President
of the United States) in the manner and under the limitations
which it shall think proper, to such inferior courts as it shall
constitute from time to time." This resolution was subsequently fashioned by eliminations, additions and emendations of
phrase, into the form which the Constitution now presents. The
resolution of July 25th in authorizing the legislature to assign
any part of the'jurisdictionabove mentioned" to inferior courts,
evidently considered that no other jurisdiction was being created. On none of the occasions in which the word "extend" was
used, in the -resolutions or propositions of the convention, was
there anything to confer the slightest plausibility on the supposition thaf the users of the word had in mind a body of unexpressed jurisdiction, which they intended to augment by providing for its extension. "Extend" does not imply extension.
In conclusion a few words may not be inappropriate concerning the final expression, upon this subject, by Justice Brewer.
"In respect" he says, in words already quoted, "to judicial functions, the question is whether there be any limitations expressed
in the Constitution on the general grant of national power." He
no longer assumes a general grant of the entire judicial power,
"of all the judicial power which the new nation was capable of
exercising," but a general grant of "national power." The
20
0n the same day as the Pinckney resolution, Randolph introduced a
series of resolutions the 9 th of which, inter alia, was "that the jurisdiction
of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear and determine in the first instance,
and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort
all piracies and felonies (n the hich seas, captures from an enemy, cases in
which foreigners or citizens of other states, applying to such jurisdiction
may be interested," etc.
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thought seems to be: there is in the Constitution a "general
grant of national power;" national power embraces unlimited
power to legislate, to execute and to adjudicate. There is therefore bestowed a general power to legislate, to execute and to adjudicate, subject to such limitations as the Constitution expresses. It expresses limitations on the legislative power. Possibly
it expresses limitations on the executive power. It does vot express in the 3d article any limitation on the judicial power, except that concerning treason, and that concerning the place of
trial for crimes. In the 11th amendment is another limitation,
barring suits against states by individuals. There are a few
others, such as the provision against excessive bail, fines and
punishments.
The foundation of this pretentious fabric is dust. The word
"nation" is not in the Constitution. The adopters of it, intended to produce a Federal state with certain powers. If these
powers made a nation, they intended to produce a nation; but it
was not a nation after the ordinary type, like England, France,
Prussia, but a nation with selected and limited powers. There
is no "general grant of national power" but a very special and
determinate grant of power which, if it makes a nation, makes
one which markedly departs from the usual pattern, and from
which an inference of judicial power that coincides with that of
the ordinary type would be fatuous.
If the new doctrine of general national judicial power is allowed to get a footing, little by little jurisdictions will be assumed that hitherto would have been pronounced usurpations.
A principle is laid down which by subtle and adroit manipulation may in time yield grandiose results. Those who would like
to witness these results, who minify the states and magnify the
Federal State, who would be pleased to see the latter swallow up
the former, will observe the laying down of the revolutionary
doctrine of Kansas v. Colorado (a doctrine by the way; which
was gratuitously lugged into the opinion,) at least with equanimity, unless indeed their dislike of unhistoric assertion and inconsequent reasonings be greater than their lust for political
change. Those whn desire that the plan of government laid
down by the men of 1787 should be perpetuated, may well invoke
unless it be too late the admonition, obstap
princihiis.
WILLIAM TRICKETT.
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MOOT COURT.
SLEEDER vs. VALLEY TRACTION COrIPANY.
Borough Ordinance-Excess Rate of Speed-Negligence-Judicial
Notice.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Plaintiff while crossing the street tracks of the defendant company in
the borough of Carlisle, was run down by a passing car and injured. Plaintiff at the time of the injury was watchful of his safety and the only evidence of negligence on the part of the company was that at the time the car
was running at the rate of ten miles per hour, whereas a city ordinance prohibited the cars from being run at a greater speed than eight miles per hour
within the municipal limits. Present action is for injuries sustained.
Arnold or the plaintiff.
Duffy for the defendant.
Failure to comply with the provisions of an ordinance is not necessaril'
negligence per se; it is merely evidence of negligence: Conner v. Electric
Traction Company; Ledderman v. P. R. R., 165 Pa. 3o6.
The injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the negligence to warrant a recovery: Wood v, Pa. R. R., 117 Pa. 3o6.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
ROBERTSON, J.-This is an action for damages. The plaintiff
claims retribution for injuries he sustained in a collision with a car which
was running at a rate of speed prohibited by the borough ordinance.
In ordcr to establish the liability of the defendant it is necessary to
prove that the car of the defendant company was being !negligently run at
the time it caused the injury to the plaintiff, and the only evidence of negligence was that the car was being run at a greater rate of speed than the
the ordinance allowed.
The plaintiff contends that the running of a rail road train within Ihe
limits of a city at a rate of speed prohibited by an ordinance under a penalty, constitute's negligence for which a civil action for damages will lie in
case injury or death results therefrom. To prove this doctrine he cites a
number of cases from Mass., Iowa, and New York.
However true this may be in regard to the law in other states, it is not
in keeping with the law in Pennsylvania. The law of this state teaches
that failure to comply with the provisions of an ordinance is not negligence
per se; it is merely evidence of negligence: Conner v. Elect. Traction Co.
173 Pa. 603.
Although evidence that a city ordinance forbade trains to be run at a
higher rate of speed than five miles an hour, may be considered in ascertaining whether the train was being negligently run, such an ordinance is not
in itself, evidence of negligence: Leiderman v. R. R. Co., 1 65 Pa. ix8.
The Company will not be held liable on the sole ground that at the time
of the injuries it was running its car in violation of a city ordinance. Negli-
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gence on the part of the Company must be proven. Nor is the mere violation of that law in itself negligence. It must be clearly shown that the violation of the ordinance was the immediate and proximate cause of the injuries; that the injuries would not have occurred had not the ordinance been
violated; and that the results of the violation ought to have been forseen in
the light of attending circumstances: Wood v. P. R. Co., 177 Pa. 3o6.
The plaintiff has submitted no evidence to prove that theinjuries would
not have occurred had the car been running within the limited rate of speed.
The maximum rate of speed allowed by the ordinance was eight miles per
hour. The car was being run at the rate of ten miles per hour. Had the
plaintiff shown the difference between the distance over which the car
traveled at the rate of ten miles per hour and the distance over which it
traveled at the rate of eight miles an hour to be sufficiently great to have
allowed the plaintiff to reach a place of safety had the car been traveling
within the speed limit, and had he proved that the -plaintiff was attempting
to cross the danger line and in all probability would have done so had the
defendant not run his car at such a speed, he would have shown excusable
grounds for an action in law. But in this case he does not do so. He attempts to recover damages for personal injuries on the ground that the
party who inflicted the injury, was at the time the damage was done, acting
in disobedience to a duty he owed the general public. Pennsylvania law
specifically states that such grounds are notsufficientto warrant his recovery:
Conner v. Elect. Traction Co., 173 Pa. 603; Stebbings case, 6z Md. 517;
American and Eng. cases, Vol. i9, page 36.
The duty of complying with the rules of an ordinance was a duty due
to the public, and the plaintiff must show how and under whatcircumstances
the duty arose to him personally: A. & E. R. R. cases, Vol. 19 page 39:
Stebbing's case, 62 Md. 517.
Unless he was a passenger, no prima facie presumption of negligence
arose from the occurrence of the accident: A. & E. cases, Vol. i9, page 36.
In light of these facts the judgment must be for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The learned court has made a proper disposition of this case.
The ground on which damages are sought from the defendant is its
negligence, or its violation of the borough ordinance with respect to speed.
The ordinance forbids a rate in excess of 8 miles per hour. The rate at
which the car was moving when it struck the plaintiff, was io miles per
hour. This is the only proof of negligence. We have too recently treated
the bearing of an ordinance of this sort upon the subject of negligence to be
justified in making an extended discussion of it. The jury has judicial notice
of many facts. It knows what Carlisle is, and what the effect of high speed
of car, on the danger to pedestrians is. It could say from this knowledge,
whether the speed was excessive. It could also consider the maximum
rate prescribed in the ordinance, as evidence of negligence. It was quite
permissible for it to find the rate of io miles negligent.
-When "a rate is prescribed with a view to the avoidance of accidents,
the mere transgression of it, if it causes hurt to another, ought to
entitle him to compensation, irrespective of any negligence that may be
involved in the case. The law prescribed care, and for this reason, gives
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compensation to those who are injured by the want of it. The law may lay
down specific duties, with a view to safety of people, and those who suffer
from the failure to perform them, ought to receive indemnity.
But, the causal relation between the act which is negligent, or which is
forbidden, and the hurt, must be established. If A has notice of the
approach of a train, he cannot, suffering an injury from it, recover from the
ipompany because the bell was not rung, nor the whistle blown. The ringing
of the bell would only have given a notice which the plaintiff already possessed. Wood vs. Penn. R. R., x77 Pa., 3o6. The learned court below has
pointed out that there is no evidence from which the jury could properly
have deduced that the too great speed was a cause of the accident. Its
circumstances are not disclosed. Would a car, running only four fifths as
fast, not have collided with the plaintiff? Or, colliding, would the injury
have been appreciably less severe? -On these matters the jury was not
enlightened.
If the plaintiff speculating upon his chance of crossing in safety, and
assured that, if the car was going at the rate of 8 miles an hour, he could
cross safely, but going at a higher rate, by one-quarter faster, he would be
struck, ventured to predicate the important action of crossing, upon the
postulate that the car was not exceeding the lawful rate, it would have been
a question for the jury whether his conduct was not unnecessarily riskful.
The probability of an intentional or unintentional excess of speed of car
is always sufficient to make it unwise to take important hazards on the
assumption that, on the particular occasion, the proper rate is being observed.
Judgment affirmed.
STEELE vs. INSURANCE CO.
Insurance-Conditions In Policy.
STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Steele obtained a policy on a house, which by its terms was to be void,
if the interest, at the taking of the policy, or at any time before its expirations, of the insured in the land on which the house stood, should be less
than an unconditional ownership in fee. A month after the issue of the
policy Steele conveyed the house, but not the ground on which it stood,
to Wm.Staples as security for a loan of $400. The written conveyance was
absolute, but the oral agreement was that on payment of the $400 with
interest, the -conveyance was to be void. The house was destroyed by fire;
the loss exceeded the amount of the policy, which was $i2oo. Assumpsit
on the policy.
Temko for the plaintiff.
The plaintiff had an insurable interest. Burkhard vs. Insurance Co;
Ix Sup. 120.

Bushman for the defendant.
The conveyance was contrary to the conditions of the policy. Sankey
vs. Howley, ix8 Pa., 30; Coatzer vs. Bittenbinder, i99 Pa., 504.
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SKINNER, J.:-It is a well established rule of law that if conditions,
like the one in the policy before us are broken, it renders the policy void.
It is not necessary to go into inquiry as to the reasons for exacting such
a condition. It is enough that the parties entered into the covenant. It
was a condition which might afford protection of a substantial character
against fraudulent incendiarism, of which insurers may well -avail themselves. It has been held in this state, where a policy of insurance required
that before the property covered by the policy should be assigned or conveyed or the policy assigned, the consent of the company indorsed in
writing should be obtained, that if said condition was not complied with
the policy fell. Girard Insurance Co. vs. Hebard, 95 Pa. St., 45- In the
case before us there was no waiver by the defendants of the condition, nor
any assent to the changed conditions of the premises insured, for no notice
was given them of the intent to transfer the title of the house'nor of the
actual transfer. Therefore if we find that Steele did not retain an unconditional fee in the land the plaintiff Steele cannot recover.
The act of June 8, iS8i, declares " that no defeasance of any deed for
real estate, regular and absolute upon its face, made after the passage of
this act, shall have the effect of reducing it to a mortgage, unless the
defeasance is made at the time the deed is made, and is in writing, signed,
sealed, acknowledged and delivered by the grantee in the deed to the
grantor, and is recorded, etc., within 6o days from execution thereof." The
legislature intended to abolish all oral defeasances. It has been held that
evidence that a deed absolute upon its face was really upon a trust that the
grantee should apply the royalties from the land conveyed to the repayment
of the grantor's debts to her for money then due, and for such as she might
thereafter pay as surety, involves a parol defeasance, which is made ineffectual to reduce a deed absolute to a mortgage by the above act: Grove vs.
Kase, 195 Pa., 325. Again it has been expressly decided that the act prevents the parol mortgagor from setting up an unacknowledged and unrecorded defeasance when suing in ejectment for the land: Sankey vs. Hawley,
i8 Pa., 30. The deed from Steel to Stapler was absolute on its face.
Under the act as quoted, the alleged parol defeasance was ineffectual to
reduce it to a mortgage. Further rulings on this principle are to be found
in Molly vs. Ulrich, x33 Pa., 41. The title and the estate, both at law and
equity were in, Stapler.' It depended upon his will whether he would
reconvey or not. The deed therefore, was not a mortgage. The condition
against conveyance in the policy was broken and the plaintiff is not
entitled to recover.:'
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
-The'policy was to be void, if the interest of the assured "in the land
on which the house stood, should be less than an unconditional fee." A
house, is for many purposes, deemed a part of the land on which it stands.
It is, however, separable both actually and conceptually. It was once, no
part of the land; it can again cease to be a part of it. For some reason,
this policy distinguishes between the house and the land on which it stood.
As Steele has not ceased to own the land in fee, the condition has not betn
violated.
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Let us suppose, however, that the parties intended that Steele's ceasing
to have an unconditional fee either-in the land or the house, should avoid
the policy. Has he ceased to own unconditionally, in fee, the house?
The conveyance to Stapler was of the house, and not the ground. It
therefore ideally severed the house from the ground, so that the house
becomes, for certain purposes, personalty. The conveyance was a security
for a loan of $400. Though this qualification was not expressed in the bill
of sale, which was in terms absolute, it could have been proved prior to the
act of June 8th, i881, and enforced. That act refers to land only. Huston
vs. Regn, 184 Pa., 419; Brown vs. Beecher, 120 Pa., 59 o . It does not prevent
apparently absolute conveyances of chattels to be transformed into mortgages by parol proof.,
But, even if the conveyance of the couse be treated as a conveyance of
land, if Burkhart vs. Ins. Co., i i Super., 280, is to be accepted as correct,
parol proof of a defeasance may be made against any body other than the
grantee, or those claiming under him. It must be admitted however, that
it is difficult to realize how, as against the grantee, the Idefeasance can be
ineffectual, and yet be effectual against the insurance company. In the
case cited, the grantee had reconveyed, and thus possibly, recognized the
defeasance. That circumstance is here wanting. But it would be highly
inconvenient to hold that unless and until the grantee admits the defeasance, it will be void, against an insurance company, but become valid
thereafter. We prefer to hold that the act of 188x, in making deeds absolute, unless the condition be written, signed, sealed, acknowledged, delivered
and recorded, makes such deeds absolute for all persons.
The house being conveyed as separate from the ground, the conveyance
was a mortgage. A mortgage is not deemed a reduction of the assured's
interest from an unconditional fee. The condition of the policy has therefore not been broken.
Judgment reversed with v,. f. d. n.
SOPER vs. TOPER.
Deposif on Land by Freshets-Measure of Damages.
.STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Toper conducted a tannery establishment, and allowed tan to be
deposited in a, stream which flowed over Soper's land. In times of high
water the tan bark was washed out of the bed of the stream over Soper's
land. Two floods occurring within four weeks, swept quantities of the
bark over 2o acres of his farm,, which consisted of but 30 acres. This is
trespass for the injury. The evidence showed that thoroughly to remove
the bark would be a costly process; that it would cost $500; and that even
the removal of the bark would not leave the soil as good, because of the
chemical substances dissolved from the bark and deposited in it. 'The
evidence was that the bark being allowed to remain, the value of the land
per acre would be reduced by $90; that before the deposit the land was
worth $140 per acre. The court permitted the jury to assess the damages
.F
at $90 per acres for the 2oacres.
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Cohen for the appellant.
The injury to the soil is merely temporary, and since the cost of the
removal of the bark, together with compensatory damages for the temporary
injury is less than the difference in value of the land, that is the true
measure of damages. Seeley vs. Arden, 61 Pa., 305. McKnight vs. Ratcliff, 44 Pa., 156.
Roush for the appellee.
The true measure of damages should be the difference in the value of
the land before and after the deposits upon it. Hoffman vs. Coal Co., 16
Superior, 631.

OPINION OF THE SUPERIOR COURT.
LA BAR, J.:-There appears to be three general rules laid down by
the courts by which to ascertain the amount of damages for injuries to real
property. First: that the measure of damages is the-difference between the
values of the land before and after the injury. This is the general rule
where the injury is of a permanent character, as where land is taken under
the right of eminent domain; and has been applied in some jurisdictions
where land is injured by reason of the washing of gravel upon it caused by
the unlawful act of the defendant. i7 L. R. A. 426, note.
The second is the cost of restoration of the property to the condition in
which it was before the injury was sustained unless such cost would equal
or exceed the value of tite property in which case the value is the correct
measure of damages. The third, which is applied in cases of deposits on
the land is the cost of removing the deposits and putting the premises in
as good condition as they were before. if that could be done, and compensation for the total or partial loss of the use and enjoyment of the premises
in the meantime. If, however, the cost of removing the deposits and
restoring the land to its former condition would be greater than the injury
from them, if allowed to remain, then the true measure of damages would
be the difference in value merely.
In Pennsylvania the courts hold that the mode of estimating damages
applicable to cases of taking under the power of eminent domain, is not
ordinarily applicable to actions of trespass. Lentz vs. Carnegie, 145 Pa.,
612; Robb vs. Carnegie, '45 Pa., 324; Welliver vs.'Penn. Canal Co., 23
Superior 79.
Where there may be more than one rule for the measure of damages
depending upon the circumstances to be proved, it is the-duty of the court
to receive proper evidence bearing, upon all the rules which might be
applicable and then to instruct the jury which rule or rules to apply after
they have determined the facts in the case.
What is the measure of damages to be applied in the present case?
The cost of removing the bark is $5oo; but the evidence shows that the
removal of the bark would not leave the soil as good because of the chemical substance dissolved from the bark and deposited in it. What damages
are to be recoved on account of this chemical deposit? Is the injury permanent? Justice Williams in Robb vs. Carnegie, 145 Pa., 324, says, "As to
a permanent injury to the'soil by the deposit of injurious particles upon it,
a chemical analsis will afford the only safe guide. Differences in the
amount of crops is some evidence but not conclusive; it might be due to
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negligent tillage, to exhaustion of the soil by long cropping, or to many
other causes." The law will not presume a permanent injury, and it is
incumbent on the plaintiff who seeks to have his damages assessed upon
that theory to aver and prove that the act complained of necessarily causes
a permanent injury to the value of the property, or at least that the injurious
conditions are reasonably certain to be permanent. P. & L. Dig. of Dec.
Vol.

21

col. 37,591.

If the injury to the land by reason of the chemical deposit was only
temporary, the defendant had a right to have the court instruct the jury that
if they so found then to confine the damages to the use during the temporary existence; and if they found that the injury was permanent, then to
determine the actual loss upon the productiveness of the farm and not upon
the decrease in value. And further that if the cost of removing the bark
plus the actual damage by reason of the chemical deposit is less than the
decrease in value, then the former is the measure of damages to be applied
in this case; but if they find that the cost of removing the bark, plus the
actual damage by reason of the chemical deposit is greater than the
decrease in value, then the latter is the measure of damages to be applied.
Seeley vs. Alden, 6x Pa., 302; Hoffman vs. Coal Co., 16 Superior 631.
The court permitted the jury to assess the damages at $9o per acre for
the 2o acres, which was the decrease in the value of the land. This we
think was not the proper mode of measuring the damages under the circumstances in this case unless the jury first finds that the cost of removing the
bark and the actual damage, by reason of the chemical deposit is equal to
or exceeds that amount, which is not shown by any of the evidence given.
It does not appear by the statement of facts that the court directed the
jury as stated above, and we are of opinion that the jury was thereby misled
as to the correct measure of damages and the judgment must be reversed
and a new trial awarded.
OPINION OF SUPREME COURT.
That defendant is liable for damages to Soper, for causing tan to be
deposited on Super's land, through the medium of the rise of water, is not
disputed. The only question is, what damage has Soper suffered? The
removal of the tan from the 2o acres would cost $5oo, but some damage
would have been suffered, prior to the completion of this removal. How
much does not appear. Had it appeared that the removal of the tan at a
cost of $5oo would have restored the land to its former value, the damages
suffered would have been the $5oo plus such loss as the presence of the tan
until its removal had inflicted. It appears, however, that the removal of the
tan would not effect the removal of all the acids and substances that would
have passed from it into the soil. But had the tan been allowed to remain,
the soil might be for a long time reduced in fertility, by 50 or 75 per cent.
whereas, had it been quickly removed, the fertility might have been reduced
by only io or i5 per cent. We think, were this shown, the measure of damages would be the loss until removal of the tan, the $Soo. the cost of that
removal, and the present worth of the difference from the time of that removal, of the selling value of the land, and what would probably have been
its selling value, had the tan never been deposited upon it.
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The trial court allowed evidence that, the bark remaining, the selling
value of the farm would have been $9 per acre less than if the deposit had
not been made, taking no account of the very great reduction of this loss
that, as far as appears, might have been effected, bad the removal of the
tan at a cost of $5oo been undertaken.
The learned Superior Court has undertaken to state three-rules for the
measure of damages; (a) the difference betweep the selling value of the
land before, and that after the deposit, (b) the cost of the restoration of
the land to its pre-deposit condition unless that cost would exceed (a); (c)
the cost of removing the deposit and putting the premises in as good condition as they were in before, and compensation for loss meantime. There
is apparently no difference between (b) and (c).
In many cases -indeed, the differencebetween (a) and (b) or(a) and
(c) is verbal. If the farm could be put into as good condition as before for
$5oo, one buying it would offer what would have been its price viinus $5oo
which he would have to spend in reparing the farm. The difference of
market value would be the expense of restorationl. Cf. Rabe v. Shoenberger Coal Co., 213 Pa. 252.
Judgment of Superior Court affirmed.

SLn (IMemortam
WHEREAS: It has pleased God inf his all-wise providence to remove
from this life our class-mate Oscar J. Groke, and,
WHEREAS: We deeply feel the loss that we have thus sustained,
therefore:
Be it Resolved: That we in this manner express our profound regret,
feeling as we do that we have been deprived of the companionship of one
who by his manliness, uprightness and integrity, had bound and endeared
himself to us all.
And furthermore, that we hereby extend to the members of his
family our sincere and heartfelt sympathy. Also:
Be it Resolved: That these resolutions be published in THE FORUM,
and the Dickinsonian; and that a copy of them be .duly sent to the
parents.

HARTLEY LEON REPOGLE,
ADRIAN H. JONES,
JOHN CI ARENCE FUNK,
For the Class of 1909, of the Dickinson School of Law.

